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1 Introduction 
1.1 The objective of this thesis 
The aim of this thesis is to assess the efficiency of the conventions regarding their capacity 
to avoid oil pollution damage caused by vessel´s accident. This assessment will focus on 
the following conventions: the Intervention Convention and the Liability Convention of 
1992 (hereinafter referred to as “CLC92”) the Fund Convention of 1992 (hereinafter 
referred as “Fund 92”) and the Supplementary Fund Protocol. 
In particular the thesis will study the inability of the channeling of liability provision stated 
in the CLC92 to provide the cargo owner with the necessary incentives to choose a 
seaworthy vessel when they are selecting it for transporting their cargo. 
 
The thesis will consider that the lack of incentives is the main cause of the vessel´s oil 
pollution damages and it takes into account that the cargo owner is the first party in the oil 
transport chain and as a party must also be held responsible in oil spills situations. 
Therefore, the principle objective of this thesis will be establishing the introduction of the 
cargo owner as liable for oil pollution in the Conventions as a solution to avoid future oil 
spills. This is support by Alan Knee-Jin Tan who mentions in one of his books that all the 
actors in the transport chain must share the burden to eliminate the sub-standards vessels 
that cause these incidents.1 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Alan Khee-Jin Tan. Vessel-source marine pollution: the law and politics of international regulation.  
Cambridge, (Cambridge University Press), 2006, page 379 
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1.2  The background of the thesis 
“Si la prise de risque inhérente au transport maritime est, par nature, admissible, elle cesse 
de l’être et devient une faute d’imprudence, lorsque, aux périls résultant de conditions de 
navigation d’un pétrolier, fût-il muni de tous les certificats, s’ajoutent d’autres dangers, 
tels que ceux liés à l’âge du navire, à la discontinuité de sa gestion technique et de son 
entretien, au mode d’affrètement habituellement choisi et à la nature du produit transporté, 
qui sont décrits comme autant de circonstances clairement identifiées, dès l’époque de 
l’acceptation de l’Erika à l’affrètement par le service vetting de la société Total SA, pour 
avoir, chacune, de réelles incidences sur sa sécurité.”2 
- The Paris Court of First Instance, ERIKA Judgment dated January 16, 2008. 
 
On December 8th 1999, the Erika, a 25 years old Italian-owned and Maltese registered oil 
tanker of some 37,000 deadweight, left Dunkirk (France) and sailed down the Channel 
bound for Italy with a cargo of heavy fuel oil.3 As the vessel entered the Bay of Biscay, it 
ran into a heavy storm. The storm worsened and on December 12th, 1999 the Erika broke 
into two and started to sink. Thousands of tons of oil leaked from its cargo tanks, polluting 
400 kilometers of the French coastline.4 
The damages caused by the accident to the environment and its economic consequences 
made the Erika- oil spill one of the major environmental disasters of recent years. 
Nine years later, the Court of First Instance of Paris was to blame the shipowner, the 
manager, the classification society and the oil company, changing the scenario for 
                                                 
2
 “Although risk-taking inherent in maritime transport, is by its nature, acceptable, it ceases to be and 
becomes a fault of imprudence, when, to the dangers resulting from the navigation conditions of an oil tanker, 
regardless of whether it had all the certificates, are added other dangers, such as those linked to the age of the 
ship, to the discontinuity of the technical management and her maintenance, to the mode of chartering 
customarily chosen and to the nature of the product transported, each of which are described as circumstances 
clearly identified, from the time of the acceptance of Erika for chartering by the vetting department  of the  
company that became TOTAL SA, as having actual effects on safety.” The Erika Judgment, Paris Court of 
First Instance, dated January 16, 2008 
3
 La justicia francesa declara culpable a Total del hundimiento del Erika. El País Online, Available at: 
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/justicia/francesa/declara/culpable/Total/hundimiento/Erika/elpepuso
c/20080116elpepusoc_4/Tes ( accessed 29 July 2008) 
4
 Ibit  
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assessment of potential environmental liability arising out of the transport of petroleum 
products by oil tankers. 
 
In a comprehensive decision, liability was imposed on the shipowner and the classification 
society who acted together to –deliberately- reduce the number of structural repairs and 
save costs at the expense of jeopardizing the safety of the ship. The oil company was also 
blamed for its negligence in chartering a vessel beyond its intended life expectancy to 
transport dangerous and persistent5 oil products. 
 
It was predictable that the shipowner and the classification society would be held liable.  
The shipowner had manipulated the survey and the repair process to save costs while the 
classification society inspector had participated in approving a temporary classification 
certificate. However, what was surprising was the liability imposed on the oil company, 
Total S.A. liability (hereinafter “Total”). 
  
The reason given by the Court of First Instance of Paris in its judgment was the 
intervention of Total in the process of control or “vetting” applied to the Erika vessel.6 The 
Court estimated that the acceptance of the vessel by Total was imprudent since the oil 
company chartered the Erika five days after its vetting approval had officially expired. 
Furthermore, Total did not take into consideration other operational factors that would not 
allow Erika´s navigation such as, 
- Multiple changes in the ownership, up to seven times; 
                                                 
5
 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and U.S. Coast Guards define persistent oil as petroleum –based 
oil that does not meet the distillation criteria for non-persistent oils. 
The non-persistent oil is a petroleum based oil that consists of hydrocarbon fractions: 
- at least  50% of which by volume, distill at a temperature of 340ºC ( 645ºF);and 
- at least 95% of which by volume, distill at a temperature of 370ºC (700ºF)  
Typical persistent oils include IFO 180, bunkers, heavy fuel oil, and NSFO. 
The Determination of Oil Persistence: A Historical Perspective. In: Freshwater Spills Symposium, 7 April 
2004. Available at : http://www.epa.gov/OEM/docs/oil/fss/fss04/watts_04.pdf  ( accessed 29 July 2008) 
6
 The vetting is a voluntary process (it is not required by any international convention) and is defined as a 
process by which an oil company determines whether a vessel is suitable to be chartered, based on the 
information available to it. The main purpose of the vetting inspection is to ensure the quality of the ship and 
its crew in terms of safety and prevention of accidents or pollution risks to accept the chartering. 
www.total.com/ ( accessed 29 July 2008) 
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- several changes in  its classification society including four different class societies; 
and   
- change four times the state of its flag, among others Panama and Malta. 
Therefore the French Court held that Total was acting in a reckless manner when deciding 
to hire a vessel like the Erika and failing to fulfill its own internal vetting rules. 
 
With this judgment, the Court fined Total €375,0007 for maritime pollution, and a share of 
almost €200 million in damages, most of which will be paid to various regional 
governments, several environmental groups and France. 
 
Having received the judgment Total announced an appeal against it in the Erika pollution 
trial. Obviously, there is the chance that the appeal would be accepted however the main 
important point for this thesis is that the judgment launches a debate: The real efficiency of 
the international conventions since the French Court decision applies its own law.8  The 
French Court ignored the conventions, in particular the channeling of liability stated in the 
CLC 92. And furthermore, after the Erika incident  it was the first time that the European 
Community (hereinafter the “EC”) had taken an intense interest in proposing changes,9 
which once more pose a serious threat to the existence of the Convention system and their 
capacity to deal with the real market situation. 
1.3 The structure of the thesis 
In order to achieve the purpose of this thesis, the next following chapters will approach the 
subsequent subjects. Chapter 2 will approach the International Conventions on civil 
liability applicable nowadays with regard to oil spill situations. The chapter commences 
studying the historical development of the actual conventions and it will reveal that after 
every oil tanker incident the conventions are revised since they are not able to response 
with adequate solutions (section 2.1). Thereafter, it will study in detail the CLC92 
                                                 
7
 375,000 euros is the maximum amount set forth in the law for non-physical individuals in marine pollution. 
supra, note 3 
8
 The French Court applies its article 8 of the Law 83-583 of 5th of July 1983. 
9
 Michael Faure and Wang Hui. The International Regimes for the Compensation of Oil-Pollution Damage: 
Are they Effective?.In: Reciel 12(3) 2003, page 248  
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Convention (section 2.2) and the Funds Conventions (section 2.3) where the key elements 
of the Conventions will be explained trying to explore their weak points. 
 
Chapter 3 will deal with the exclusion of cargo owner as potential liable party in an oil 
spill. According to this, it will launch the negative consequences of the non inclusion of the 
cargo owner as potentially liable in the CLC 92 (section 3.1) to continue with the changes 
on the Convention system proposed by the European Union (section 3.2). 
 
Chapter 4 will consider the United States of America (hereinafter “United States”) position 
which has its own legislation, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, well-known as OPA90 
(section 4.1). The chapter will investigate its main characteristics (section 4.2) to later 
focus on those States that introduces the cargo owner as liable in oil spill situations (section 
4.3). 
Finally, chapter 5 will arrive at the conclusion if the actual Conventions are efficient 
avoiding accidents at sea or instead, the imposition of the cargo as liable for oil pollution in 
the Conventions is a solution to avoid them. 
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2 The legal framework: the International Conventions 
To enable to discuss the efficiency or not of the current Conventions, I would like first to 
look into the history of the Conventions which will help us to understand their origin and, 
second, explain briefly the basic and weak elements of these Conventions. 
 
2.1 History 
In 1967, the Torrey Canyon spilled 880,000 barrels of cruel oil off the Southwest coast of 
England. The incident showed that the maritime world was not prepared for such major 
pollution incidents and confirmed the inadequacies of the traditional legal principles10 in 
dealing with problems concerning oil pollution liability and compensation.  
 
Thus, the Torrey Canyon incident initiated intensive activities at national and international 
level11 to achieve a new regime capable to cope with these problems. To address the issue 
of marine oil pollution liability and compensation, the International Maritime 
Organization12 (hereinafter the “IMO”) passed the International Convention on Civil 
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage of 1969 (hereinafter the “CLC 69”) which established 
the grounds for a Compensation Fund. 
 
This Compensation Fund was formalized under the International Convention on the 
establishment of an international fund for compensation for oil pollution damage of 1971 
                                                 
10
 Liability for oil pollution damage was generally limited under the International Convention Relating to the 
Limitation of Liability of Owners of Sea-Going Ships of Brussels, 10 October 1957. 
11
 Chao Wu. Liability and Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage: Some Current Threats to the 
International Convention System. In: Spill Science & Technology Bulletin, Vol.7, Nos. 1-2 (2002), page 106. 
12
 At that point it was called the International Maritime Consultative Organization, IMCO. The IMO has the 
status of an executive agency of United Nations as of 1980 and it is a specialized agency with responsibility 
for the safety of shipping and the prevention of marine pollution by ships. Available at: www.imo.org 
(accessed 24 July 2008) 
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(hereinafter the “FUND 71”). The abovementioned Conventions became the basis of the 
pollution liability system in the following years, even if the shipping industry and the oil 
industry produced two private schemes, TOVALOP in 1969 and CRISTAL in 1971, to 
provide compensation on an equivalent basis to the CLC and FUND Conventions. 
The CLC 69 was criticized by both the shipowners and the victims. On one hand, the 
shipowners considered the CLC 69 excessive for the conservative world of the marine law 
of 1969 since it replaced fault liability with strict liability and doubled the liability limits.13 
On the other hand, the victims feared that compensation might be inadequate for oil 
pollution damage from large tankers because the compensation would be decided by the 
capacity of the insurance market rather than by the oil pollution damage or the shipowners´ 
conduct.14 
 
After the entry into force of the CLC 69 and FUND 71 Conventions the Amoco Cadiz 
disaster took place15 and once again it was showed that the liability limits of the old 
regimes were too low to provide an adequate compensation in the event of a major oil 
spill.16 
 
In 1983 the IMO legal Committee met for the purpose of revising the conventions. 
One year later, in 1984 two protocols were adopted17 to achieve the objective of adapting 
compensation in cases of larger oil spills: the Protocol of 1984 to amend the International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Pollution Damages 1969 and the Protocol of 1984 to 
amend the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
compensation of Oil Pollution Damage 1971. 
 
                                                 
13
 Jacobsson M. The International Conventions on liability, compensation for oil pollution damage and the 
activities of the international oil pollution compensation Fund. In:  Lloyd´s of London Press (1993), pages 
39-55 
14
 Ibit at pages 39-55 
15
 A spill of 223,000 tonnes off the Brittany coast of France in 1978 
16
 Michael Faure and Wang Hui, supra, note 9, page 245 
17
 Ibid at page 245 
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In an effort to induce United States participation, the Protocols broadened the scope of both 
geographical application and recoverable damages and substantially raised the liability 
limits of the two conventions.18 However, the United States rejected the idea of limited 
liability and believed polluters should suffer unlimited liability for the damage caused. 
Besides, in 1989 the Exxon Valdez19 incident occurred and the United States decided to 
adopt its own legislation, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (hereinafter the “OPA90”). As a 
result, the Protocols failed to enter into force because of insufficient support from major 
countries particularly from the United States. 
 
The experience taken during almost twenty years of application stemmed in a new IMO 
diplomatic conference in 1992. The IMO created new protocols to the two conventions. 
These protocols were identical to the 1984 Protocols except for the entry into force 
requirements.20 The main purpose of the new Protocols was to facilitate the fulfillment of 
the requirements for the entry into force of the 1984 Protocols. This change was intended to 
make the conventions effective without the participation of the United States. The 1992 
Protocols became effective from May 1996. 
 
The 1992 Protocols constitute a two-tier system of compensation. The first level, the Civil 
Liability Convention 1992, imposes limitation of liability on the shipowner while the 
second level, The Fund Convention 1992, establishes supplementary regime addressed to 
compensate when the damages exceeds the limits of the first level.21 Both conventions are 
still applicable,22 and I will therefore discuss them in a bit more detail immediately below. 
                                                 
18
 Suzanne Hawkes and R. Michael M´Gonigle.  A black (and rising?) tide controlling maritime oil pollution 
in Canada. In: Osgoode Hall Law Journal (1992), page 175 
19
 Exxon Valdez ran aground in Prince William Sound, Alaska and spilled over 11 million gallons on March 
24, 1989. Inho Kim. A comparison between the international and US regimes regulating oil pollution liability 
and compensation. In: Elsevier Science Ltd. (2003), page 12 
20
 The Protocol changed the entry into force requirements. It reduces from six to four the number of large 
tanker-owning countries that are needed to become the Protocol effective. Available at: www.imo.org 
(accessed 25 July 2008) 
21
 Francisco Javier Martín. Los convenios internacionales de responsabilidad e indemnización de 1992. In: 
Petrotecnia, (April 2003), page 41 
22
 In October 2000 the IMO Legal Committee agreed to increase in 50% the amounts available under the 
1992 protocols as a response to the Erika accident. Michael Faure and Wang Hui, supra, note 9, page 247 
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However, before going into the conventions in depth could be interesting analyze this 
historical development under IMO. As we can notice the conventions were revised after 
each oil tanker incident demonstrating that they were not able to response with adequate 
solutions. This reveals that IMO is not an active but a reactive organization,23 IMO only 
revises its regulation once the accident has already taken place and in addition, the new 
conventions are slowly ratified by the Member States and take numerous years to come 
into force.24 
 
The main cause of this slowness is that the conventions are the result of the battle between 
the different Member States into IMO: coastal states and flag states. The coastal states have 
an interest in seeing damages to the marine environment and higher levels of 
compensations included in the conventions in order to protect their coasts25 while the flag 
states support the shipping interests and they are not prone to accept the implementation of 
new measures. The difficulty to arrive to a common solution makes IMO “as slow as its 
slowest member.”26 However, must be keeping in mind that IMO is still being a dynamic 
organization and therefore, in the following sections we will studies the developments that 
IMO has made in CLC 92 and the Fund 92. 
 
                                                 
23
 It is important to have in mind that IMO is a consultative organization with law-making competence given 
under the UN Law of the Sea Convention. This competence allows the IMO to create not only non-binding 
instruments but also binding instruments.  Peter Ehlers and Rainer Lagoni. International Maritime 
Organisations and their Contribution towards a Sustainable Marine Development. 1st edition. Hamburg ( LIT 
Verlag), 2006, pages 78-79 
24
 An example of this slowness is the OPRC Convention which was adopted in 1990 after  the Exxon Valdez 
incident  and came into force  in 1995, five years later the Oil Pollution Act, Ibid at page 92 
25
 This interest can be extracted from the works of the ILA Committee on Coastal States Jurisdiction relating 
to Marine Pollution. Vessel-source Pollution and Coastal State Jurisdiction. 1st edition. The Hague (Kluwer 
Law International), 2001 
26
 Peter Ehlers and Rainer Lagoni, supra, note23, page 97 
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2.2 The Intervention Convention and the Liability Convention of 1992  
The CLC92 is the main international regime governing the liability of shipowners in oil 
pollution cases. This regime has been adopted by more than 100 states around the world 
with the US as the most notable exception.27 
 
The basic scheme of CLC92 imposes strict liability on the owner of the vessel for oil 
pollution damages regardless of fault. This liability is excluded in a restricted number of 
cases and it is also limited to an amount which depends on the tonnage of the vessel. The 
strict liability and the limited liability will be studied in depth in the following sections. 
Following, firstly I will study the exclusive provision stated in article II of the CLC92. 
Secondly, I will analyze the Fund 92. And, finally I will clarify the legal consequences of 
these provisions in relation to the cargo owner. 
 
2.2.1 The channeling of liability 
The strict liability is mentioned through the channeling provision found in article III of the 
CLC92. 28This article contains two mentions “shall be liable” and “pollution damage”, 
meaning that we are facing a rule for civil liability. Section 1 of the named article clearly 
establishes the liability of the owner of the ship, which is defined by 3 concepts: ship, 
person and property.29  
 
                                                 
27
 The regimen has been adopted by 103 States parties Available at: www.iopcfund.org  (accessed 25 August 
2008) 
28
 Article III section 1 of the CLC92 states: “Except as provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, the 
owner of a ship at the incident, or, where the incident consists of a series of occurrences, at the time of the 
occurrence, shall be liable for any pollution damage caused by the ship as a result of incident” 
29Article I section 1 of the CLC92 defines vessel as “any sea-going vessel and any seaborne craft of any type 
whatsoever, constructed or adapted for the carriage of oil bulk as cargo, provided that a ship capable of carry 
other cargoes shall be regarded as a ship only when it is actually carrying oil in bulk during any voyage 
following such carriage unless it is proved that it has no residues or carriage of oil in bulk aboard.” 
In this way CLC92 differs itself from the CLC69 which not included the ship in ballast and is more briefly: 
“Ship means any sea-going vessel and any seaborn craft of any type whatsoever, actually carrying oil in bulk 
as cargo.” 
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It follows that the owner of the vessel could be any individual, society or public law entity 
(constituted or not as a company), even a State or any of its politics subdivisions, registered 
as owner of the vessel or if the ship was not registered, who owns the vessel.30 
 
Moreover, CLC92 imposes strict liability on the owner of the vessel. The main 
consequences of the term “strict liability” is that claimants do not bear any burden of 
showing how the incident happened, or of proving negligence on the part of the shipowner, 
his crew, or others for who, he may be held responsible.31 The shipowner will pay the 
damages caused by the ship´s pollution, even if some of the owner´s responsibilities are 
transferred to the charterer.32 
 
However, the strict liability imposed by the convention on the shipowner is subject to a 
number of exceptions. The owner of the vessel will not pay damages, exonerate him from 
liability, if it can be proved that the damages were caused by circumstances as: 33 
“(a) resulted from act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a natural phenomenon of 
an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character, or 
(b) was wholly caused by the act or omission done with intent to cause damage by a third 
party, or 
(c) was wholly caused by the negligence or other wrongful act of any Government or other 
authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or other navigational aids in the exercise 
of that function.”34 
 
                                                 
30
 Article I section 2 of the CLC92 defines person as “any individual or partnership or any public or private 
body, whether corporate or not, including a State or any of its constituent subdivisions” and continues in 
section 3 defining owner as “the person or persons registered as the owner of the ship or, in the absence of 
registration, the person or persons owning the ship.”  
31
 Colin de la Rue and Charles B. Anderson. Shippping and the Environment. 1st edition. London, ( LLP, 
London Hong Kong), 1998, page 87 
32
 This happens for example under the time charter where the charterer is responsible for manning and 
equipping the vessel and sometimes even for maintaining.  Thor Falkanger, Hans Jacob Bull and Lasse 
Brautaset, Scandinavian maritime law, The Norwegian perspective. 2nd edition. Oslo (Universitetsforlaget) 
2004, page 239 
33
 Article III section  2 of the CLC 1992 
34
 The main characteristic that difference section (a) from (b) and (c) is the fact that in  section (a) is sufficient 
for  the exemption to be the dominant cause and it is not necessary to be the “wholly caused” for the pollution 
damage while in sections (b) and (c), the shipowner must prove that the damage was entire caused by matters 
falling with the exclusions. Colin de la Rue and Charles B. Anderson, supra, note 31,  pages 87-93 
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Therefore, taken into consideration these circumstances we can assume that the convention 
establishes an original civil liability system which moves away from the system based on 
fault. 
 
It was pointed out that this liability has an objective character. The liability is independent 
from the careful behavior or not of the owner of the vessel, who will be liable ipso iure, 
once it has been checked the causal relation between the spill and the damage.35But should 
we really understand the liability as an objective civil liability? One could think this but 
even the objective civil liability still need the causal relation, meaning that it would need at 
least a direct intervention from the shipowner in the activity generating the damage, even if 
this intervention was not personal,.36 Nevertheless, the CLC92 does not demand that causal 
relation and article III of the Convention really mentions “obligation ex lege”.37 
 
The idea that the actual intention of the Convention was to establish an “obligation ex lege” 
is not really valid because the main intention of the drafters was to anticipate exactly the 
person who will compensate the damages in each single circumstance: the owner of the 
vessel. In this way the Convention will avoid future litigations about who is the actual 
liable in an oil spill.38Consequently, article III of CLC92 covers not only situations where 
the shipowner was actively operating the vessel but also situations where he is not directly 
involved, such as bareboat charter. 
 
There is a good reason why the CLC92 adopted this attitude. The owner of the vessel is the 
easiest person to identify through the registration of the ship because the functional 
conditions of the charterer and of the owner could not be fit in the same person. There are 
                                                 
35
 This causal relation is based on the idea that the person who obtains benefits from dangerous activities but 
social useful, must bear their costs. José Luis Meilán Gil. Estudios sobre el regimen jurídico de los vertidos 
de buques en el medio marino. 1st edition. (Aranzadi) 2006, page 441 
36
 Ibit at page 441 
37
 Obligation ex lege is the obligation that is directly born from the law, is not predictable, only is requirable 
the obligation expressly named. Rafael Arenas García. La distinción entre obligaciones contractuales y 
obligaciones extracontractuales en los instrumentos comunitarios de derecho internacional privado. In: 
Anuario Español de Derecho Internacional Privado (2006), page  397 
38
 José Luis Meilán Gil, supra, note 35, page 441 
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contracts of affreightment such as: leasing, voyage chartering and time chartering where 
the functional conditions of the transport are split. For example, the owner of a vessel can 
operate his own vessel becoming also his shipper and even, sometimes, carrier. In this way, 
the owner combines all these functions in one person. However, the situation can also be 
the contrary: the owner can charter his vessel and transfer its nautical control and therefore, 
he is not becoming shipper and even the shipper could not become carrier. 
 
The CLC92 solves the scenario by choosing the easiest solution: the owner of the ship is 
the only liable39 in the strictest sense of the term. Specifically, “the owner of the ship at the 
incident, or, where the incident consists of a series of occurrences, at the time of the 
occurrence, shall be liable for any pollution damage caused by the ship as a result of 
incident”.40 According to this, the buyer of a vessel sold during a voyage will not be liable 
for accidents took place before the sale but during that voyage. 
 
Section 4 of article III establishes a reservation made to section 5 of the same article:41  
“[n]o claim for pollution damage under this Convention or otherwise may be made against: 
(a) The servant or agents of the owner or the members of the crew; 
(b) The pilot or any other person who, without being a member of the crew, performs the 
ship. 
(c) Any charterer (howsoever described, including a bareboat charterer) manager or the 
ship 
(d) Any person performing salvage operations with the consent of the owner or on the of a 
competent public authority; 
(e) Any person taking preventive measures; 
(f) All servants or agents of persons mentioned in subparagraphs (c), (d) and (e);” 
 
                                                 
39
 The CLC 92 Convention  uses the term ”ship of the owner” instead of ”shipowner” which is the term used 
in the general conventions about limitation of liability, trying to introduces under the term ”shipowner” the 
shipper without property, the charters.. José Luis Meilán Gil, supra, note 35, page 446 
40
 Article III section 1 of the CLC 92 Convention 
41
 Article III section 5 states : “ Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice any right of recourse of the owner 
against third parties” 
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The meaning of this section is really dangerous since it states a legal prohibition to claim 
for oil pollution damages to a large number of persons different than the owner of the 
vessel, and it states also the impossibility to present claims on the grounds of other 
dispositions42 because the CLC92 announces “no claim compensation for pollution damage 
under this Convention or otherwise may be made”.43 
 
Consequently, the CLC92 goes further than the CLC69 Convention which never tried that 
these other individuals, apart from the owner of the vessel, were not considered liable and 
were not obligated to compensate damages.44 
 
Nevertheless, this article is not numerus clausus, since in the last paragraph it states that 
“unless the damage resulted from their personal act or omission, committed with the intent 
to cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would probably 
result”. 
 
Given what is said above, it is allowed to claim compensation to servants, agents or persons 
performing salvage operations among others in cases where the “subjective” requisite of 
the last paragraph is met. Section 5 of article III should be studied in the framework of the 
last paragraph of section 4 as it states that the only allowed to claim compensation to these 
other individuals is the owner of the vessel through the right of recourse. 
 
But what happen with the cargo owner who is not specifically mention in the list? The 
answer to the question will be discussed afterwards however, as an introduction we can 
affirm that the completely silence as regards the cargo owner is a double-edged sword. On 
one hand the cargo owner is not going to be liable since he is not mentioned in article III 
section 1. However, on the other hand the channeling provision of the convention will not 
                                                 
42
  The expression “disposition” makes reference to different Codes as the Maritime Codes and Commerce 
Codes among others. 
43
 Article III, section 4 of the CLC92 Convention. 
44
 José Luis Meilán Gil, supra, note 35, page 448 
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protect him as it does with the persons described in section 4 of the same article. Thus, this 
means that the cargo owner can be liable under rules of non-contractual responsibility. 
 
2.2.2 Limitation of liability 
The CLC92 establishes in article 5 section 1 that  
“the owner of a ship shall be entitled to limit his liability under this Convention in any one 
incident to an aggregate amount”. 
However section 2 raises an exception to section 1  
“the owner shall not be entitled to limit his liability under this Convention if it is proved 
that the pollution damage resulted from his personal act or omission, committed with the 
intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would 
probably result.”  
Therefore, the privilege of limitation of liability is not absolute, but not as bad as it could 
thought after reading section 2 since the burden of proof with respect to the facts which 
would prevent the shipowner from the limitation of liability lies on the claimant.45 
Consequently, the regime of limitation of liability in maritime claims has been established 
in favour of the shipowner.46 
The right of shipowners to limit their liability47 for pollution damage under CLC92 is 
important not only as a quid pro quo for the strict liability imposed upon them but also for 
the role it plays in apportioning the burden of oil spills between the shipowner and the 
shipping and oil industries under the system of compensation established by the Civil 
Liability and Fund Conventions.48 
 
                                                 
45
 The idea comes from the basis of the case Goldman v. Thai Airways, this case dealt with the same 
limitation wording stated in the Warsaw Convention. Gotthard Gauci. Limitation of liability in maritime law: 
an anachronism?. In: Marine Policy, Vol. 19, no.1 (1995), page 71 
46
 Ibit at page 71 
47
 One of the arguments to retain the limitation of liability is that since the CLC92 imposes compulsory 
insurance, it would be very difficult to obtain any insurance in claims where there is not limitation. Ibit at 
page 66 
48
 José Luis Meilán Gil, supra, note 35, page 454 
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Under the CLC92 the limit of the ship´s liability is set at 3 million SDR49 for ship up to 
5,000 tons. Above that size, the limit increases by 420 SDR each ton over said threshold up 
to a maximum of 59.7 million SDR.50 These figures are substantially higher than those set 
by CLC69. Moreover, while in the CLC69 there is no minimum liability limit for small 
tankers, the CLC92 establishes a minimum limit of 3 million SDR which applies for 
tankers of up to 5,000 tons. 
 
2.2.3 The exclusive provision 
The CLC92 states in its article II:  
“[T]he Convention shall apply exclusively: 
(a) to pollution damage caused: 
(i) in the territory, including the territorial sea, of a Contracting State, and 
(ii) in the exclusive economic zone of a Contracting State, established in accordance with 
international law, or, if a Contracting State has not established such a zone, in… 
(b) to prevent measures, wherever taken, to prevent or minimize such damage” 
In this way article II provides for an exclusive provision which warrants that the State 
signing the Convention cannot apply another civil liability legislation in cases of an 
pollution damage of the characteristics51 described in the CLC92. 
 
As an example of the effects of this exclusive provision could be mentioned the 
implementation of the CLC92 into the Norwegian Maritime Code which announces in its 
section 193 first sentence: 
“Claims for compensation for oil pollution damage can only be made against the owner of 
the ship according to the provisions of this Chapter” 
                                                 
49
 Special Drawing Right (SDR) is defined in the rules of the International Monetary Fund and is based on a 
weighted average of dollars, yen, pounds and euros. 
50
 Article 5.1 of the CLC92 Convention 
51
 The type of pollution damage covered by the CLC92 is described in article I, paragraph 6 as “(a) loss or 
damage caused outside the ship by contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship, 
wherever such escape or discharge may occur, provided that compensation for impairment of the environment 
other than loss of profit from such impairment shall be limited to cost of reasonable measures of 
reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken; (b)the costs of preventive measures and further loss or 
damage caused by preventive measures” 
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Section 193 is included in chapter 10 “Liability for Damage from Oil Pollution” of the 
Norwegian Maritime Code which clearly mentions that the liability and damages from oil 
pollution will be regulated according to the rules of the CLC92. Thus, the Norwegian Code 
has not other choice than to regulate the chapter according the CLC92. 
 
Therefore, the Convention states a maximum standard about the applicable liability, 
liability that cannot be exceeding by any Contracting State. As we will see later the EC is 
nowadays developing its own rules to avoid oil spills; this means that if the EC would 
establish stricter rules, these rules could not be applied according to the exclusive provision 
in the Contracting States of the CLC92. The consequences of the confrontation between the 
EC and the CLC92 are still not established but sadly, I hardly believe that would be 
negative for the CLC92 and its continuity. 
  
2.2.4 The oil company in the CLC 92 
The scheme established by the CLC92 and the FUND92 Convention is the result of the 
commitment between the principal actors of the oil maritime transport industry: the 
vessel´s owners and the companies producing the oil. Thus, the owner of the ship will 
respond in case of an incident while the oil companies contribute to the Funds depending 
the volume of the oil transported. Both responsibilities are completely different since on the 
one hand the owner of the vessel only pays if there is an accident and on the other hand, the 
oil companies contribute regularly to the Funds in exchange for not paying when the vessel 
that transport their cargo has an incident. 
 
The oil company can directly hire the transport of its crude oil by a chartering contracts 
becoming at this point charterer, but it is also possible that the oil company delegates the 
charterer functions in a third company. In this last scenario its only relation with the vessel 
is that the oil company is the owner of the cargo that the vessel transports 
The distinction between cargo owner as charterer and cargo owner as simple cargo owner 
must be taken into consideration when we will study the consequences of the channeling 
provision of the CLC92. The reason why this distinction is so necessary is because if the 
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cargo owner becomes charterer he will be protected under article III section 4. However, if 
he is just cargo owner the section will not protect him. Consequently, in the latter scenario 
his liability must be studied by the rules of non-contractual responsibility. 
 
2.2.4.1 The charterer 
As previously studied, the CLC92 introduces an important exception to the channeling 
provision through article III section 5 that 
”nothing in this Convention shall prejudice any right of recourse of the owner against third 
parties.” 
The aim of this section is to channel all the claims to the owner of the vessel to avoid 
arguments about the role of third parties in the incident since the result of these arguments 
would be the delay in the claims payment. Nevertheless, this section allows the owner of 
the vessel once the damages are repaired to call for the actors taking part in the incident to 
collaborate in the reparation.52 
 
Therefore, the CLC 92 allows the owner of the vessel to claim by right of recourse the 
costs of the repaired damages to the charterer but this right does not mean that the charterer 
will be jointly liable for the damages. Consequently, the owner should demonstrate that 
there is a causal relation between the charterer´s conduct and the incident and this, of 
course, will partly depend on the degree of the charterer´s participation in the operation of 
the vessel, in short, in the type of chartering contract signed. 
 
2.2.4.1.1 Demise or bareboat charterers  
A shipowner who fixes his ship on a voyage or time charter is obliged to man and equip the 
vessel. In any case, there are situations where the contract involves the ship itself, where 
                                                 
52
 The aim of the right of recourse is to avoid the injustice of imposing liability on the shipowner in bareboat 
charter contracts. 
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the shipowner has no obligations with respect to manning and equipment the vessel. These 
types of contracts are known as a bareboat or demise charter.53 
 
In terms of bareboat charters, the charterer has the completely disposition of the vessel. The 
charterer has the responsibility for the navigation and administration in return of a quantity 
of money. The control that the charterer has over the vessel makes him hire the master, 
officials and crew and control that the ship is equipped. Then, the owner of the vessel is 
apart from the operation of the vessel. 
 
The idea that the charterer will have total control of the vessel will establish the existence 
of a causal relation between his conduct and the incident. To provide with a better right of 
recourse the use of standard forms of demise or bareboat charterparties are common. These 
standard forms include terms of indemnity from the charterer to the owner. A typical clause 
is number 15 in the BARECON 89:54 
“The Charterers shall indemnify and hold the Owners harmless against any lien of 
whatsoever nature arising upon the Vessel during the Charter period while she is under the 
control of the Charterers, and against any claims against the Owners arising out of or in 
relation to the operation of the vessel by the Charterers. Should the Vessel be arrested by 
reason of claims or liens arising out of her operation hereunder by the Charterer, the 
Charterers shall at their own expense take all reasonable steps to secure that within a 
reasonable time the Vessel is released and at their own expense put up bail to secure the 
release of the vessel” 
 
Therefore, it is enough to compensate the owner of the vessel when at the time of the 
accident the vessel was operated by the charterer. The need to demonstrate the fault or 
negligence in the navigation of the vessel by the bareboat charterer is not necessary. 
 
 
                                                 
53
 Thor Falkanger, Hans Jacob Bull and Lasse Brautaset, supra, note 32, page 434 
54
 Colin de la Rue, Charles B. Anderson, supra, note 31, page 630 
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2.2.4.1.2 Time or voyage charterers 
In terms of voyage charters, the owner of the vessel is who manages all the principal 
aspects of the vessel operation and the charterer is the one that loads and discharges the 
cargo. However, in the time charter the charterer participates more in the operation of the 
vessel controlling commercial part of the vessel while the owner of the vessel controls the 
nautical part.55 
 
Therefore, both types of contract have in common that the owner of the vessel and the 
charterer share, in different ways, the operation of the vessel. The fact that the owner and 
the charterer share the operation of vessel complicates the decision about who is liable in 
case of an incident. Just to mention briefly, the main important discussion in these types of 
contracts is the safe port or berth warranty provision. This provision states that the vessel 
must load and discharge at the harbor or place which is considered to be safe by the 
charterer. This provision is a warranty for the owner of the vessel since the charterer is 
taking the risk of choosing a safe port, even if the insecurity of the port was not known at 
the moment of signing the contract. 56 
 
The port is considered to be safe whether damages would be avoided by the right behavior 
of the master or the crew, and unsafe whether the crew should show a higher degree of 
knowledge to avoid oil pollution damages. 
 
2.2.4.1.3 The cargo owner 
As said above, the oil company can delegate to a third party the typical activities of the 
charterer, meaning that the relationship with the vessel is just the property of the 
transported cargo. This option is the central object of this thesis because it will have 
important consequences for the civil liability of the oil companies. 
 
                                                 
55
 Thor Falkanger, Hans Jacob Bull and Lasse Brautaset, supra, note 32, pages 244-245 
56
 Colin de la Rue and Charles B. Anderson, Liability of Charterers and Cargo Owners for Pollution from 
Ships .In: Tulane Maritime Law Journal, Vol. 26 (2001), page 29 
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The cargo owner is not mentioned by the CLC92 all along its regulation. This results in not 
considering the cargo owner liable for pollution damages on those cases foreseen by the 
convention. In the preparatory works of 1969 and 1992 conventions, the inclusion of the 
cargo owner as a liable party, together with the owner of the vessel was considered. 
However this liability was not introduced as, among other things, it was understood that it 
would complicate the claim procedure. 57 
 
Therefore, this silence also means that the cargo owner is not protected by the channeling 
provision and that there is not any disposition that allows the victims to address their claims 
to the cargo owner. Conversely, the experience demonstrates that this omission is not as 
important as it seems to be and in practice it is really difficult that the claims will suceed 
against the cargo owner.58 
 
In effect, due to the fact that there is not a disposition in the whole convention that states 
the potential liability of the cargo owner the claim must be governed by non-contractual 
responsibility. The non-contractual responsibility demands a negligent action or omission 
to be the fact resulting of the accident, and is at this stage when the difficulties appear. It is 
very difficult to get the cargo owner liable since he is not the one who took the control of 
the vessel and as a result, there would not be a clear causal relation between the damage 
and his action.59 
 
However, the possibility to impose liability on the cargo owner would not be something so 
strange since this is common in a numerous of national environmental rules, as i.e. article 
                                                 
57
  The inclusion of the cargo owner as a liable party was also considered during the preparatory works of the 
Oil Pollution Act in United States and the Merchant Shipping Act in UK but as the CLC69 and CLC92 the 
cargo owner was never introduced. Gotthard Gauci, Oil Pollution at Sea: Civil Liability & Compensation for 
Damage London,(John Wiley & Sons Canada, Ltd.),1997, page 98 
58
 Huesca Viesca M. and Rodríguez Ruíz de Villa D. Responsabilidad Civil por Contaminación Marina por 
Vertido de Hidrocarburos. A propósito del Prestige. 1st edition. Oviedo, (Universidad de Oviedo) 2004, page 
82 
59
 Ibid at page 82 
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1908 of the Spanish Civil Code.60 Thus, it might be possible to impose liability applying 
the analogy of article 1908 of the Spanish Civil Code. 
 
 
2.3 Fund Conventions 
In addition to the compensation due from the shipowner under the CLC92, extra 
compensation is available under the Fund Conventions, also named IOPC Fund. However, 
the Fund 92 is not unlimited in its compensations and as the CLC92 establishes a limit to 
the maximum amount offered to each compensation. The available aggregate compensation 
under the CLC92 and the FUND92 is more than double that the provided by the original 
versions of 1969 and 1971.61  
 
Yet, recent accidents involving oil tankers as the Erika and the Prestige62 incidents 
highlighted once again that this compensation was not enough to cover the damages and in 
May of 2003 IMO tried to solve the problem creating a new protocol to the FUND92 on 
compensation for oil pollution, the Supplementary Fund Protocol 2003. The Supplementary 
Fund Protocol 2003 could lead to a trebling of the amounts available for oil pollution 
compensation as compared with today´s scheme. 
 
The Protocol 2003 has established a maximum for the quantity of compensations. The 
maximum quantity to incidents occurred before the first of November of 2003 was of 208 
millions of dollars, including the sum paid by the owner of the vessel. The limit increased 
in that date with 50 % to 313 US$. In March 2005, a complementary Fund with of 844 
millions of dollars was created. This Fund will be in addition to the before amount in that 
                                                 
60
 The Spanish Civil Code gets liable the cargo owner for damages, among others, where the machinery 
exploits due to the lack of due diligence or when people or properties get damaged due to the excessive 
smoke. 
61
 Article 5 of the CLC69 and CLC92, article 5 of the Fund Convention 1971 and article 4 of the Fund 
Convention 1992 
62
 In 2002 the Prestige grounded contaminating  the Galician coast, in northern Spain.  
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States which decide to voluntary join this protocol.63 One of the principal purposes of the 
Fund under the 1971 Convention was to pay indemnification to the shipowner, to relieve 
him of part of the financial burden imposed upon him by CLC69 but no similar provision 
can be found in CLC92. 64 
 
Nowadays, the main purpose of the Funds is to pay compensation for oil pollution from 
ships when adequate compensation cannot be obtained from the shipowner under the 
CLC92. It is understood as inadequate compensation under the CLC92 when one of these 
circumstances are met:65 
a) where no liability for the damage arises under the CLC 
b) where the owner liable for the damage under the CLC is financially incapable of 
meeting his obligations in full, and any financial security provided under CLC 
the does not cover or is insufficient to satisfy the claims for compensation which 
result from an incident; or 
c) where the damage exceeds the owner´s liability as limited by the applicable 
version of CLC.” 
However, even if the compensation is not adequate under the CLC92 the Funds will not 
pay compensation in the following circumstances:66 
a) The damages happened in a State which was not a member of the Funds; 
b) the damages were the consequences of war act or other act related to a warship; 
or 
c) the claimant cannot demonstrate that the damages were caused by a vessel.” 
 
The IOPC Fund is financed by the oil company´s contributions, the oil companies who 
receive the oil transported by sea,67 in short, the receivers of the crude oil or heavy fuel oil.  
                                                 
63
  21 States are member of this Protocol, including Spain and Norway. Available at: www.iopcfund.org 
(accessed 25 August 2008)  
64
 Colin de la Rue and Charles B. Andersom, supra, note 31, page 127 
65
 Article 4.1of the Fund Convention 1992 
66
 Article 4.2 of the Fund Convention 1992 
67Explanatory note prepared  by the Secretariat of  the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds of 
August 2008. Available at: http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/genE.pdf (accessed 21 August 2008) 
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In this manner, through the Funds the oil companies promise to cover the pollution 
damages with the fund created for this purpose. In particular, the FUND92 imposes to 
contribute to the companies of the member States receiving per year more than 150.000 oil 
tons transported by sea. Finally, the membership fees paid by the oil company depend on 
the amount required by the Funds each year to perform their mandate. 
 
Therefore, the international maritime community through the compensations to the IOPC 
Fund tries to connect the receivers to the oil spill. However, this convention is not effective 
since the contribution of a particular cargo owner is not modified when the vessel where his 
cargo is transported has an accident that causes pollution damages. According to this, the 
accident is not going to change the cargo owner´s economic results and thus, the 
connection does not really exist. 
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3 The cargo owner in the actual conventions  
This chapter is the most critic of the whole thesis since studied the main problems of the 
conventions. Firstly, I will try to demonstrate the lack of incentives to hire a safe vessel 
given by the CLC92 and the Fund 92 and the consequences that this has in the number of 
oil spills. Secondly, I will present the European Commission position since it thinks that 
the change in the channeling of liability is necessary. And finally, I will reflect on the 
efficiency of the conventions.  
 
 
3.1 The negative consequences 
On the previous chapter of the thesis, we have emphasized the introduction of strict liability 
on the owner of the vessel by article III of the CLC92 and the corresponding exclusion of 
the charterer as liable in its article IV(c). The convention does not specifically mention the 
cargo owner in any of its articles. The result of this silence is that the cargo owner will not 
be liable for damages caused by the vessel´s pollution. However, as seen before,68 the 
silence will not receive the protection given by the channeling provision either. In practice, 
this non-protection will not be really important since it is hard to prove the cargo owner´s 
implication in the accident. 
 
Therefore, having analyzed the relevant conventions, it is time to pose the following two 
questions:  
-Which are the consequences of the non-inclusion of the cargo owner in the CLC92? and, 
-Is this silence of the CLC92 influencing in the oil transport market? 
 
                                                 
68
 Section 2.2.4.1.3, the cargo owner. 
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The most important and criticized consequence produced by the non-introduction of the 
cargo owner in the CLC92 is the lack of incentives for the cargo owner to avoid accidents. 
Once the cargo owner realizes that he is not going to be liable in any case for pollution 
damages caused by the vessel´s accident inside of him “grows the feeling” that not only the 
accident but also, the pollution damage is something not relating to him. 
 
Certainly, the quasi-impossibility to claim against the cargo owner is translated in the lack 
of incentives to hire a safe vessel capable to transport his cargo since in the case of an 
accident, the accident is not going to affect in his economic results anyway. This is the 
main reason why during the last century the oil companies got rid of part of their fleets and 
they have started to charter vessels to transport their products, especially in cases of really 
cheap cargo.69 
 
According to this, we can also affirm that nowadays the oil companies only control one 
fourth of their fleet, the rest is controlled by independent shipowners. In 1974 the 
companies controlled 40% of the oil tankers and in 1999 just 25%. 70 According to this we 
can demonstrate that the conventions imposition of liability only on the owner of the vessel 
has produced a disincentive for oil companies to carry the oil in their own vessel.  
The oil companies perfectly know that the CLC92 is on their side and getting rid of their 
fleets has the convenient result that they are not going to be liable for oil pollution damages 
during a vessel´s accident. 
 
Another reason to get rid of their fleets is the public opinion. Any time that there is an oil 
spill of one of the oil companies´ vessels the oil company is judged by the public opinion. 
An example of this affirmation is the Exxon Valdez case where the vessel belonged to 
Exxon-Mobil.71 As opposed to Exxon-Mobil, in the Prestige case the oil company had 
                                                 
69
 The Prestige was transporting really low quality oil which would not be possible to legally use as 
combustible in the European Union. El Prestige seis meses después. 1st edition. Greenpeace, (2003), page 8 
70
 Ibit at page 9 
71
 The economic costs for the pollution damages were really high, but the highest cost was its company 
image. In 1989 Exxon was one of the five biggest companies in United States but its oversight of information 
about the catastrophe to the public let Exxon in a very bad position.  Juan José Larrea, Entre la espada y la 
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chosen an unknown intermediary: Crown Resources. The used of an unknown company as 
Crown Resources was an advantage for the real company who face up the accident without 
the citizens/consumers pressure.  
 
However, the disincentive to carry the cargo in their own vessel is not the only 
consequence of the non-liability on the cargo owner under the CLC92; another important 
consequence is that many cargo owners are opting for the cheapest and oldest vessel.72 The 
oil market and the chartering market are really competitive markets and in these type of 
markets finding the cheapest oil tanker is an essential business element.73 In these terms the 
only vessel´s characteristic taken into account when it comes to hire the vessel is its price, 
not its risk. In short, most of cargo owners are not interested in paying more for better ships 
even though there are serious worries about the environmental safety of these vessels.74  
 
The damages caused to the environment and the economic consequences in accidents as the 
Erika and the Prestige confirms the risk presented by old and poorly maintained ships. As 
an example of this risk, an important relation between the age of the vessels and the 
accidents was established: 60 of the 77 oil tankers that wrecked from 1992 to 1999 were 
older than 20 years old.75  
 
Moreover, the ISL Market76 analysis World Shipbuilding and Maritime Casualty studied 
the losses of vessels between January 2002 and June 2006 and it has established the 
percentage of losses according the age of the vessel: 
-more than 25 years old, 22.8% 
                                                                                                                                                    
comunicación, article part of the book Profesionales para un futuro globalizado,1st edition, Ediciones Uñate 
(2003) page 10 
72
 It is important to mention that the charter rate is very low, especially for hydrocarbons such as fuel oil, and 
this does not promote the use of newer vessels. Supra, note 3 
73
 Communication from the Commission to the Parliament and to the Council about maritime safety in oil 
transportation, COM (2000)142 final, 21 March 2000. 
74
 Jeffery D. Morgan. The Oil Pollution Act of  1990: A look at its impact on the oil industry. In: Fordham 
Environmental Law Journal , Vol. VI, (1994), page 17 
75
 Supra, note 73 
76
 The ISL is an Institute of Shipping, Economics and Logistics which one of its competences is “prepare and 
offer knowledge and information around marine logistics for all the involved actors” Available at: 
www.isl.org/index.php?lang=en (accessed 10 August 2008) 
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-between 20 and 24 years old, 37.1% 
-between 15 and 19 years old, 26.8% 
-between 10 and 14 years old, 5.3% 
.between 0 and 9 years old, 8% 
This demonstrates indeed, that from 15 years old, even from more than 20 years old, the 
accidents are increasing in relation to the years of the vessel. Of course, this affirmation 
does not mean that all vessels older than 15 years are unacceptable but at least it shows that 
the risk of defective ship in this age is higher. 
 
Therefore, at this point of the discussion we can state that the cargo owner does not have 
any type of incentive to hire for the transportation of his oil a solvent company with a safe 
vessel. Contrary, if an accident takes place the cargo owner will not be liable and then, the 
choice of a substandard and old vessel does not make any change in his liability. 
In short, one important element that influences the decision to hire one vessel or the other is 
the lowest price. Obviously, must be taken into consideration that another element that 
influences the decision is the possible loss of the cargo however, this is just important when 
it comes to transport a precious cargo and not when the cargo is really cheap.77 
 
However, being the owner of the vessels the only liable in case of accident, why the 
vessel´s conditions are not improved? At the current situation, cargo owners only care 
about profitability. Therefore, they will always choose the cheapest option. There is a big 
difference in price between a new and safe vessel and a substandard and old one. In this 
situation cargo owners will choose the substandard and old. Hence, there is not any 
incentive for the vessel´s owner to replace and modernize their fleet, it will not be logical to 
order new vessels. 
 
Another element that disincentives the owner of the vessel to improve the quality of the 
vessel is the short-terms agreements. The cargo owners refuse to enter into long-term 
charter agreements because they prefer short-term charter agreements. However, this kind 
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 As it was mention in footnote number ,67 the Prestige was transporting oil with a very poor quality. 
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of agreements does not provide security to the owner of the vessel to invest in new 
tankers.78 The shipowner will not invest in a new vessel if he is not completely sure that he 
is going to have the chance to hire it for a long period of time. 
 
In this type of short-terms charter agreements, the vessel´s age is once again not the 
important characteristic. It is not only because the cargo owner is not hiring it for a long 
time (in most of cases for a simple voyage) but also because the price of the vessels is 
dictated by the shipowner with cheaper prices who offers the oldest vessels. Due to the fact 
that it is difficult to find quality and profitability, small independent shipowners79 are 
winning market quota without taking into account the risk associated with the navigation of 
the vessel. 
 
The cargo owners affirm that it is responsibility of the shipowners to change the old 
vessels. This change would increase the rate and profitability of new vessels,80 and as said 
before, only old vessels provide money to the shipowner which means that those vessels 
will be running until their death. Hence, the old vessel market is only a downwards spiral. 
The shipowners do not invest in new tankers because the cargo owners always choose the 
cheapest vessel (in most of cases the oldest) and the cargo owners choose the old vessels 
because they are the only available on the market. 
 
In short, as we can notice, the current market is too competitive to think about the 
environmental consequences of using a substandard vessel. This is the reason why we need 
the help of organizations which will regulate the market to avoid future catastrophes. The 
solution given by the IMO was the CLC92 which declares strict liability on the shipowner. 
                                                 
78The order of new ships started to decrease in the second half of 1990. By mind-1992 sixty percent of the 
world´s tanker tonnage was fifteen years old or older. Moreover, recent orders for new tankers have not been 
sufficient to correct this trend. Jeffery D. Morgan, supra, note 74, page18 
79
 There are three types of tanker ownership: independent ownership, goverment ownership and oil company 
ownership. Inho Kim. OPA 90 and the decisions to own or charter tank vessels. In: Journal of Maritime Law 
& Commerce, Vol. 35, No. 2, (2004), page 231 
80
 Jeffery D. Morgan, supra, note 74, page18 
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However, is CLC92 effective to control the market and establish measures to avoid 
accidents? The answer, at this stage, comes alone. It is not effective. 
 
It can be argued that the cargo owner can bear part of the damages through contributions to 
one of the IOPC Funds. However, it will be studied that the IOPC Funds are not capable to 
create the incentives necessary for the cargo owner to improve the safety of the vessels. As 
mentioned above, the cargo owner bears part of the pollution damages through its 
contribution to the Fund. These contributions are set according to the tons transported and 
they are invariable regardless the pollution. In brief, the contributions are not increased 
once an accident takes place.  
 
Moreover, their main problem, together with the limitation of the available compensations, 
is that the Funds are not a preventive but a compensation mechanism. Compensations are 
only payable if necessary when damages are not full covered by CLC92. Of course, it is 
much better for the cargo owner to face the payments when an accident has occurred rather 
than to assume the cost of operating a vessel and controlling it when the crew fulfills the 
necessary levels of security and training.81 
 
In addition, compensations are not only insufficient for the seriousness of the damages 
caused, but also the path to achieve the compensation is long and difficult. It is worthy to 
mention that only few weeks before the Prestige accident the Fund of 1971 just paid the 
compensations regarding the Aegean Sea which ran aground in A Coruña in December 3, 
1992.82 
 
As we described above, the contributions to the IOPC Funds are made by the crude oil´s 
importers. Therefore, a paradoxical situation will arise when an accident occurs, the cargo 
owner who has been negligent selecting the vessel not only would never be found liable for 
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the pollution caused but also would be entitled to receive compensation due to the cargo 
lost in the accident. 
 
It is important to mention that there is the voluntary possibility for the cargo owners to help 
to repair the pollution damages motivated by the necessity to watch over the company´s 
image. This was showed at the Erika accident. At this time, even if from the beginning the 
convention was applicable and there was not any exception to break the channeling 
provision stated in article III of the CLC92, Total83 assigned about 200 millions84 to 
recuperate the coastline, evacuate pollution and finance the pumping of the Erika among 
others. 
 
However, this type of acts must not be used to affirm the successful operation of the actual 
conventions because these acts take place when the cargo owner has a special relation to 
the place where the oil spills have happened. In contrast, must be clarified that it will be not 
strange if this will not happen when the oil spill is far away from the place where his 
costumers are. Taking into account the explanations above, it is hard to affirm that the 
CLC92 Convention follows the “polluter pays principle”85 which established that the costs 
generated by the pollution has to be borne by the entities responsible for the environmental 
impact. Those who profit from an activity should bear the risk generated by such activity.  
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And the main important question: Why must be the cargo owner be excused from liability 
when he is an important party in the oil transport chain? As Inho Kim establishes in one of 
his articles “the cargo sector should not be excused from sharing spill costs simply because 
the cargo sector defers to the shipping sector in matters of risk management.”86 
 
 
3.2 The European Perspective 
Every year 800 millions of crude tons are transported from/to the European ports. 
Approximately the 70% of the maritime crude transportation in the European Union is 
carried out in front of the Atlantic Ocean, the North Sea and the rest 30% in the 
Mediterranean Sea. Apart from that, large number of oil tankers sail in European waters 
without stopover which means a higher volume of tankers and of course, a higher risk. 
 
This is the main reason why the European Commission has played a central role in the 
process of updating the international regime of oil-pollution compensation. However, since 
the Erika incident in December 1999 the EC has taken an intense interest in proposing 
changes which pose a serious threat to the existence of the Convention system. At this 
point it is important to mention the continuous criticisms that the channeling provision has 
received by the European Commission. It has been criticized the inappropriate balance 
between the responsibilities of different players and their exposure to liability. In this way, 
it has been recommended amendments to the CLC92 Convention to abate shipowners 
limitation of liability rights.87  
 
In the communication in response to the Prestige accident, the Commission invited 
Member States to support proposals aimed at “removing the de facto immunity of other key 
players, in particular the charterer, operator or manager of the ship from compensation 
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claims”88 instead from recourse claims by the registered owner, because this provision 
avoid the capacity of the victims to claim directly to these parties. Thus, the Commission is 
focused on the principal element in a pollution damage, the compensation of its victims. 
 
In the past years, the Commission, due to the numerous accidents in front of its coast, has 
changed its direction when it comes to avoiding the accidents. It established in a Directive 
to the European Parliament89 the necessity to change the actual maritime rules. The 
Directive states that the actual Conventions, based on international regimes of civil 
liability, are insufficient in relation to deterrent effects because they do not discourage the 
negligent acts limiting themselves as useless instruments to avoid the accidents and 
considers that only the criminal sanctions are sufficiently effective to make work the 
legislation against pollution damages. The Commission is convinced that we will obtain a 
deterrent effect when we will announce that the pollution damages constitute criminal 
sanctions. Only at this point a social disapproval will be born in a different character than 
the one in the civil compensations instruments. Hence, the criminal sanction is a serious 
warning to the future players in the maritime transport with a better deterrent effect.90 And 
it ends affirming that if the actual Conventions and the changes applicable to them91 will 
not have any result, the Commission will present a proposal to approve an European 
Legislation which will implement an European system with regard to marine pollution. 
This system would require the formal complaint of actual Conventions in Liability and 
Compensation for oil Pollution Damage. 
 
This thesis is not defending the opinion that only criminal sanctions would solve the 
current situation as this study is focused on civil regimens. However, it is important to not 
forget that current conventions are not being fulfilling an important objective,  which is 
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avoid environmental accidents at sea. Therefore, there are many scholars and organizations 
as the European Commission that are questioning the actual efficiency or not. 
 
The last proof from the European Union of the inadequacies of the channeling provision in 
the CLC Convention and, therefore, the necessity of change is the opinion of the Advocate 
general Kokott92 in accordance with the Waste Framework Directive93 and its 
consequences in the Mesquer Judgment.94 The European Court of Justice affirms that if the 
cost of disposing of waste from a tanker´s oil spill is not or cannot fully be borne by the 
owner of the vessel and or by the International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage, the national law of a Member State of the European Union may provide for that 
cost to be borne by the producer of the product. 
 
As a result of the Erika accident the heavy fuel oil spilled in the accident polluted among 
others, beaches in the Commune of Mesquer which was claiming damages against Total 
Group, the owner and producer of the oil. The town claimed that the oil accidentally spilled 
at sea was per definition “waste” by the Waste Framework Directive, such that Total 
International Ltd and Total France should be liable for the cost of disposal, in their capacity 
as ‘previous holders’ or ‘producer of the product from which the waste came’ respectively. 
 
The case reached the Supreme Court of France which raised three questions to the Court of 
Justice. For the purpose of this study we will focus on the third one: “[w]hether in the event 
of the sinking of an oil tanker, the producer of the heavy fuel oil spilled at sea and/or the 
seller of the fuel and charterer of the ship carrying the fuel may be required to bear the cost 
of disposing of the waste thus generated, even though the substance spilled at sea was 
transported by a third party, in this case a carrier by sea.”95 The Court answered 
affirmative: 
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“[W]hen heavy fuel oil, produced during the refinement of crude oil, was discharged from a 
ship at sea, the producer of the oil, as well as the seller of the oil and the charterer of the 
ship, could be held liable for the cost of disposing of pollution on the coast caused by the 
oil.”96 
With this new judgment of the European Court of Justice, the European Union re-affirms 
the necessity to change those rules that nowadays are not successful.  
 
 
3.3   The summary 
We have previously studied the most important elements of the current conventions, the 
CLC92 and the Fund92 with its Supplementary Fund Protocol 2003. Moreover, in this 
chapter we have been also studied the negative consequences of these elements and the 
European position concerning the conventions. Therefore, at this stage we should wonder 
whether an important objective of the convention as must be avoid accidents is being 
fulfilled. 
 
Since the CLC92 and Fund92 are ruling, the number of oil spills caused by vessel´s 
accidents has not decreased. There are still accidents happening as, 
-1996: Sea Empress ran aground spilling 10,000 tons of cruel oil 
-1999: Erika broke apart spilling 3 million gallons of heavy oil 
-2002: Prestige sank and 20 million gallons of oil remains underwater 
-2003: Tasman Spirit cracked into two pieces leaking 28,000 tons of crude oil into the sea 
-2007: Hebei Spirit collided with a steel wire spilling 2.8 million gallons of crude oil. 
 
We cannot deny IMO efforts to avoid oil spills. The raise in compensations would not have 
been possible if they would not have lobbied to change the Conventions. However, these 
changes are not enough and perhaps the efforts should direct to the heart of the problem: 
the strict liability only on the side of the owner of the vessel. In my opinion, the solution 
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must be the extension of the liability to other parties involved in the transportation of the 
oil as the cargo owner who at the end is the party trusting in the capacity of the vessel when 
it comes to transport his cargo and as some authors announces the cargo owner “is the 
creator party of the pollution risk”.97 
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4 The North America´s solution 
This chapter will study the legislation applicable in the United States legislation with 
regarding oil spills. As we already mentioned the United States has passed its own Act 
moving away from the international perspective, the CLC92 and Fund92 conventions.98 
 
First of all, this chapter will make an overview of the situation where the Oil Pollution Act 
of 1990 (hereinafter OPA 90) was born and its relevant elements for this thesis, to later on 
study the States that establish the liability on the cargo owner in their own law. Therefore, 
the purpose of this chapter is to conclude whether OPA 90 and the States laws are the right 
legislation to reduce the oil spills accidents. 
 
4.1 Oil Pollution Act 1990 
In March 1989 the tanker Exxon Valdez transporting 53 million gallons of oil from the 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline terminal at Valdez (Alaska) to California, grounded in Prince 
William Sound spilling more than 11 million gallons of crude into Alaska waters. Within 
weeks, there were three major spills in Newport, Delaware and Houston in a two-day 
period. This was followed by the super tanker Mega Borg off Galveston spilling 4.3 million 
gallons into the Gulf of Mexico and after by the tanker spill in Huntington Beach 
(California) and several spills in New York Harbor.99 
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The Exxon Valdez together with these last accidents catapulted the problem of oil pollution 
to the front pages of the national awareness. In the face of these events, the Congress had 
three choices:100 
a) keep debating the ratification and postpone the decision 
b) ratify the international conventions, as recommended by the Coast Guard, because it 
would solidify an uniform international oil spill regime; or 
c) react and enact a legislation with an important domestic impact. 
Finally, the Congress which was concerned about the costs and risks of maritime oil 
transportation, moved quickly to pass the Oil Pollution Act 101 in August 1990.102 
 
However, in 1992 the United States participated in the CLC but it rejected the amendments, 
most of scholars affirm that United States considered the CLC, even with the 1992 
modifications, not efficient in large spills accidents and refused to join an international 
convention with a lower compensation than the one provided by its legislation, the OPA 
90.103 
 
The scope of the OPA 90 is to reduce the occurrence of future oil spills through preventive 
measures, such as improved tanker design and operational changes and to reduce the 
impact of future oil spills through heightened preparedness. In these terms, the OPA 90 
addressed a number of areas of concern including oil pollution liability and compensation, 
spill response planning, international oil pollution prevention and removal. 
 
The new law was really criticized since it introduces new requirements for oil shippers to 
the United States. Taken into consideration the United States’ growing dependence on 
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oil104 and the potential future oil producers´ reactions in regard to these requirements, one 
commentator even announced that the United States with the enact of the Act became “the 
first nation in history that has tried to blockade itself”.105 
 
As will be seen at the end of this chapter, the years have demonstrated the bad precision of 
this declaration,106 but firstly should be interesting studied the elements introduced in the 
shipping industry by the OPA 90. 
 
4.1.1 Liability  
The OPA 90 places strict joint and several liability on the 
“responsible party for a vessel or a facility from which oil is discharged, or which poses 
the substantial threat of a discharge of oil, into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining 
shorelines or the exclusive economic zone”.107 
 
Moreover, the “responsible party” is defined in the case of a vessel as “any person108 
owning, operating, or demise chartering the vessel”.109 Hence, thanks to this broad 
definition the OPA 90 expands the scope of liability and provide injured parties with a 
great chance of recovery the damages. Moreover, OPA 90 requires proof of financial 
capacity to cover an oil spill before the entrance of a ship in U.S. waters since its main aim 
is to ensure that parties injured by an oil spill are compensated for their damages,.110 In 
addition, OPA 90 allows claimants to pursue claims against any and all responsible parties 
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and it also states unlimited liability on grossly negligent polluters, attempting to promote 
safety and pollution prevention before spills occur. 
 
The OPA 90 differs from CLC92 on the liability imposed on the demise or bareboat 
charterer and on the time or voyage charterer. In terms of bareboat charterer, the OPA 90 
expressly announces strict liability for clean-up costs and damages arising from an oil 
spill.111 This is quite usual in general maritime law since the bareboat charterer is 
considered owner pro hoc vice. Nevertheless, the really big change from the common law 
that the OPA 90 introduces is that the liability is joint and several with the owner of the 
vessel and the operator. This means that in a spill accident where the costs exceed the 
limitation applicable to the owner of the vessel112 the claimants have the capacity to look to 
other responsible parties, i.e. the bareboat charterer.  
 
In terms of time or voyage charterer, it can be argued that this type of charterer is neither 
the owner nor the demise charterer. Therefore, it can be mentioned that the inclusion of a 
demise charterer as the responsible party excludes, by negative implication, the time or 
voyage charterer. 
There are not case law that can clarify this, neither the OPA 90. Then, the only possibility 
would be addressing the liability of the time or voyage charterer under the term “operator”. 
However, the typical operator´s activities are none of the normal activities control by the 
time or voyage charterer. This results in the impossibility to include the time charterer or 
voyage charterer under the term “operator” found in the OPA 90.113  
 
Thus, as small introduction to the section 4.1.3 we can affirm that OPA 90 as the CLC92 
does not impose liability on the cargo owner. Nevertheless, this affirmation is not 
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completely true since OPA 90 allows its States to impose the liability on the cargo owner in 
their own legislations.  
 
4.1.2 Limitation of Liability  
The limits114 established under OPA 90 are not effective if the accident is caused by the 
responsible party´s gross negligence, willful misconduct or violation of an applicable 
federal safety, construction or operating regulation. The responsible would also be deprived 
of limitation of liability if he fails or refuses to report the incident, to provide reasonable 
cooperation or assistance in connection with removal activities, or to comply with orders 
relating to removal activities or protection of public health,115 providing no protection for 
responsible parties under state law. Moreover, removal costs and damages exceeding the 
liability limits of the OPA 90 will be covered by the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund 
(hereinafter the “OSLTF”) up to 1 billion dollars per incident. 
 
However, there are so many federal regulations so easy to infringe that the promise of 
limitation of liability under the OPA 90 seems practically impossible.116 Apart from this, 
OPA 90 does not prohibit the States to enact their own legislation in oil pollution affairs.117 
This means that the States could impose additional liability or unlimited liability in cases of 
oil spills. Hence, we can affirm that in practice the limitation of liability imposed by the 
OPA 90 will never exist thanks to federal regulations and additional liabilities. 
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4.1.3 The cargo owner in the OPA 90 
The OPA 90 originally had a provision which made the owner of the oil liable for pollution 
damages and clean-up the zone where the oil spill has happened, but during the legislative 
process the idea of cargo owner being liable was abandoned.118 Finally, the OPA 90 only 
imposes strict liability in the “responsible party” that in this case is the owner of the vessel, 
the operator or the demise charterer. Therefore, the definition does not include the owner of 
the cargo aboard the vessel: there is not federal statutory oil spill liability. Of course, cargo 
owners have, in general, less control over the vessel than other parties but this must not be 
an excuse to not be liable, they may be subject to liability for negligence in situation as 
elections of the vessel. 
 
Scholars have suggested that the result of not imposing liability on the cargo owner betrays 
the OPA 90´s main purpose which is prevent spills, not pay for them once they took place. 
In addition, scholars have understood that to not impose liability on the side of the cargo 
owner creates no real incentives when it comes to choosing its carriers. Presumably, the 
theory is that the shipper will not select carriers with poor spill records, the carriers with 
poor spill records will cease to be profitable and ultimately, these carriers will cease 
operating.119  
 
Even if the cargo owners escape from the OPA 90 there is one situation where they do not 
have that escape. This is the situation where the damage was caused “solely by act or 
omission” of the cargo owner. Meaning that the owner or operator will escape from 
liability if he is completely free of fault and the cargo owner´s negligence is proven. 
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A case law demonstrating this is Boykin v. Bergesen120 where in relation to article 2702 
section 2 of the OPA 90 the court decided that the cargo owner was negligent in failing to 
advise the carrier of the dangerous character of the coal cargo which exploded during 
discharge. However, it is quite difficult to imagine a scenario where this could happen, a 
scenario where the cargo owner is the solely responsible for the accident. The reason is that 
there are other parties more involved in the transport than the cargo owner. Moreover, the 
OPA 90 states the prohibition of the contractual re-assignments of oil spill liability in its 
article 1710 section b, meaning that is going to be even more difficult expand the cargo 
owner liability. 
 
However, the OPA 90 is not the only source for oil pollution liability in the United States. 
The States also have the capacity to legislate their own laws and as it will be seen in the 
next section, some States have included the liability of the cargo owner in an oil pollution 
accident. 
 
 
4.2 The States´ law 
Many States fought hard to protect their liability legislations and finally, the OPA 90 
permitted the States to impose liabilities on polluters in excess of those imposed under the 
new federal law.121 This is exposed in its article 2718 which states”122 
“Nothing in this Act shall- affect, or be construed or interpreted as preempting  the 
authority of any State or political subdivision thereof from imposing any additional liability 
or requirements with respect to: 
  (a) the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within such State ; or 
  (b) any removal activities in connection with such a discharge” 
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In these terms, another scope of the OPA 90 is to coordinate national and States laws to 
ensure adequate compensation. In this way, since the adoption of the OPA 90 every coastal 
State, Hawaii and the States bordering the Great Lakes have adopted their own legislation 
in order to avoid future oil spills. 123 
 
Therefore, even if OPA 90 does not hold cargo owner liability, it achieves the same result 
by preserving existing States laws.124 OPA 90 invites the States to supplement the existing 
regulations with their own legislation that in cases can be stricter than the national one.125 
However, the important fact for this thesis is that many States implement cargo liability to 
achieve their environmental protection. 
In this way, when an accident takes place the cargo owner does not face liability under the 
OPA 90 but could face liability if the accident took place in a State where its oil pollution 
law states liability on the cargo owner. Unlimited cargo owner liability is established in 
some States, such as: Alaska, Carolina, Hawaii, Maryland, North Carolina, Oregon and 
Washington. Limited cargo owner liability is established in other States as: Florida, New 
Jersey and New York.126 And of course, there are other States where their legislation does 
not explicit mention the cargo owner´s liability. However, this liability is quite abroad and 
the cargo owner can be considered as potential liable.  
 
We can find this last option in States such as:  Mississippi, Missouri, Virginia or Ohio 
among others. Mississippi´s legislation establishes liability on “any person who causes 
pollution or causes a contaminant to be placed in a location likely to cause pollution.”127 
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Missouri states in its legislation “any person who causes pollution or causes, permits or 
places a contaminant in a location where it is reasonably certain to cause pollution.”128 
Virginia announces in its rules “any person discharging or causing to be discharge” or “any 
person who owns, operates, charters, rents, or otherwise exercises control over or 
responsibility for a facility, vehicle, or vessel.”129 And finally, Ohio which declares that 
will be liable “any person who causes contaminates to be place in a location to cause 
pollution.”130 
 
As we have seen these States just mention as liable the “person” without specified the 
owner or operator of the vessel, leaving the definition quite open to introduces as possible 
liable the owner of the oil transported. In short, we can affirm that the States have their own 
oil pollution laws,131 and following we will illustrate some States that introduces 
specifically in their legislations the cargo owner as liable in an oil spill. 
 
4.2.1 California 
The Lempert-Keene-Seastrand Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act (hereinafter the 
“Act”) was enacted in September of 1990.132 The Act regulates all aspects of oil spill 
prevention and response. The Act understands as “responsible party” for the oil spill among 
others:  
“the owner or transporter of oil or a person or entity accepting responsibility for the oil.”133 
 
Thus, in California is not only responsible the owner or the operator of the vessel, as the 
OPA 90 affirms, is also the owner of the oil, the cargo owner. Moreover, the cargo owner 
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will be liable for the following damages:134 cost of response, containment, clean-up, 
removal and treatment, injury to or economic losses resulting from destruction or injury to 
real or personal property, destruction or loss of natural resources, including reasonable 
costs of rehabilitating wildlife or loss of use and enjoyment of natural resources among 
others. Therefore, the cargo owner does not escape from the Carolina´s legislation and he 
will pay for all the damages caused. 
 
4.2.2 Alaska 
Alaska State imposes liability to “a person causing or permitting the discharge of oil” and 
he “shall immediately contain and clean up the discharge.”135 Nevertheless, the clean up 
must be carried out in the manner approved by the Department of Environmental 
Conservation of Alaska. If the clean up manner is not approved, the Department of 
Environmental Affairs will contract the persons to clean up the area and the costs will be 
paid by the responsible of the oil spill. Therefore, the owner and the person having the 
control of the oil that is spilled into Alaska´s waters are jointly and severally liable for 
damages from the release of the oil without regard the fault.136 
 
4.2.3 Oregon 
Oregon States imposes strict liability by law to “any party owning of having control over 
the oil that enters the water and pollutes the water to collect the oil and remove the oil 
immediately.”137 If it was not possible to collect and remove the oil the same party must 
take all practicable actions to contain, treat and disperse the oil.138 Under these rules then, 
the cargo owner is responsible for the cleanup of the damaged zone and, in case of this not 
being possible, to treat the spilled oil. 
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4.3 The results of the Oil Pollution Act 1990 and the States´ law 
After the enactment of the OPA 90 there were many authors that criticized it since it was 
considered that the OPA 90 isolates the United States from the rest of the world.139 It could 
be true; but it is also true that the OPA 90 has demonstrated that it has been successful in 
achieving its principal objective: avoiding oil spills. 
 
Since the adoption of the Act in 1990 until 2004, there has been a reduction in the number 
and volume of oil spills by tanks in the United States´ waters. The number of oil spills is 
still maintaining a downward trend.140 It was established that if the OPA 90 was never 
enacted, nowadays the oil spills would be at least 80% higher than in 1990.141 
Moreover, the vessels that enter nowadays in the waters of the United States are better and 
newer than before142 and both the shipowners and cargo owners have increased the 
vigilance in their choice of vessels, the initiatives for preventing oil spills and the stricter 
standards to protect the environment.143 In short, as the CRS Report for the Congress 
affirms the OPA 90 is the key player in the spill volume reduction.144 
 
But, who is the real key player: the OPA 90 or the States´ law?  
 
As we have seen, OPA 90 establishes unlimited liability without introducing the cargo 
owner as potentially liable, limiting in this way the risk of the cargo owner in oil spill 
accidents. This results in a lack of incentives for the oil industry. Thus, exactly the same 
situation that we have studied in relation with the CLC92 in the previous chapters. 
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Moreover, liability imposed on the shipowner and on the cargo owner creates more 
important incentives than the imposition of liability only on the side of the shipowner. To 
support this argument it was concluded that in the States where the cargo owner is liable 
there are fewer oil spills than in the States where their legislation do not impose this 
liability on them.145 
 
Therefore, I hardly believe that the success achieved by the OPA 90 to reduce the number 
of oil spills is not its success. The real key players in this reduction are the States´ laws 
where the cargo owner is liable, which were able to solve the lack of incentives under the 
OPA 90. 
 
4.4 Canada 
Canada also has its own legislation which imposes liability on the cargo owner, The 
Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. The Act states:146 
“ [T]he owner of any ship that navigates within the arctic waters and the owners of the cargo 
of any such ship…are jointly and severally liable, up to the amount…, for costs, expenses and 
loss or damage…resulting from any deposit of waste…The liability of any person…is 
absolute” 
 
It follows that the cargo owner will be liable to the same extent as the shipowner for the 
costs of the pollution. Then, the Canadian regimen suggests that it is possible to find a way 
of imposing liability on the cargo owner, although this solution is more complicated than 
simply impose the liability on the shipowner. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
It would be unfair to affirm that the current conventions are completely ineffective since 
they have introduced really important elements to the international maritime world. Firstly, 
one of their contributions was to tackle the oil pollution problem from an international 
perspective since it is an international problem that affects most of countries.147 Secondly, 
the conventions have been ratified by a great number of States so the remedies that they 
present are common to most States of the world.148 And finally, they have been modified to 
solve the problems each time that an accident demonstrated their limitations, so they are 
active systems. 
However, the current conventions have not been effective in a specific area: Avoiding the 
oil spills. The reason for this inefficiency is that the cargo owner receives very little 
incentives from the CLC92 and FUND92 conventions and they still base their choice on 
the price and not on the safe conditions of the vessels. 
 
There are many voices, as the European Union, that affirm that we should change the way 
to tackle the accidents which caused the oil spills. Their idea is to change civil liability into 
criminal liability, but there are some problems of imposing the criminal liability: Firstly, to 
impose strict criminal liability in situations of oil spills caused by vessels is evidently 
tending to hinder the effective protection of the environment from the effect of spills. And 
secondly, a consequence of this criminal liability is that it raises a serious impediment to 
cooperation and coordination between those who are liable by law.149 
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Even if the CLC92 which is based on the civil liability nowadays is not as effective as we 
would like to I am still thinking that the civil liability is the solution to deal with oil spills. 
The solution that I have tried to expose during the whole thesis is that there must be a 
change in the channeling of liability. The shipowner cannot be the only one liable in cases 
of oil spills because this has as a consequence a disincentive in the complete oil transport 
chain. This was also stressed by the European Commission who thinks that there is a real 
relationship between the liability of the party and the incentives to choose a safe vessel.150 
 
Some can argue that the extension of the liability can carry problems such as lengthy and 
duplication of procedures or that the victims have to wait too many years for their 
compensations.151 However, I think these problems are not enough to avoid the change. It 
is odd that this second problem is already a problem in the actual conventions (I have been 
discussion this in chapter three). 
 
There are also scholars that go further and affirm that the shipowner and the oil companies 
are not the only polluters. There are other entities that also get benefits from this oil since 
the carriage of oil is indispensable to the industrialized nations. In this way, they 
understand that the general citizenship of those nations should be paying the damages or at 
least, share the risk.152 Nevertheless, the consumer cannot be understood as a responsible 
party since there is a huge number of consumers and the costs incurred by the consumers 
are hard to capture.153   
 
My solution would be the introduction of the cargo owner as a liable party because this will 
create a much closer link to the risk of the ship. As was said before the cargo owner is an 
important member of the oil transport chain together with the shipowner. Therefore, the oil 
companies influence the decisions of the shipowners through the conditions of their 
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chartering contracts. Moreover, they would be capable of making decisions in the safety 
measures of the shipowners´ vessels. 
Someone could think that the solution would be exchange the shipowner´s liability for the 
cargo owner´s liability. This solution would be completely wrong since the imposition of 
the liability on the cargo owner is not an option. Following this solution there would be a 
lack of incentives for the cargo owner and the corresponding consequences that we already 
know. 
 
However, the inclusion of the cargo owner as potentially liable must be linked to the IMO´s 
effort to play a more prominent role in the implementation and enforcement of the new 
regulation with the intention to come unstuck the shipping interest. 
Therefore, with the IMO´s effort and the introduction of the cargo owner as potential liable 
in oil spills their influence over the shipowners and their vessels could be realized and the 
number of oil spills would be decreased drastically. 
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